Some of you will be writing your paper on a question about invertebrate animals. To help you out I've created this guide to the topic. You will want to read this post before creating your paper plan and add some of the readings below to your reading list.
Invertebrates don't have a spinal cord and don't have a central nervous system like ours. Some questions in invertebrate ethics are:
- Do clams and oysters have moral standing?
- Is it OK to boil and eat lobsters?
- Do insects have moral standing?
- Is there anything wrong with taking honey from bees?
To think about these questions, there are several separate questions to explore. I'll outline some issues below and provide links to readings.
For invertebrates to have moral standing, is it pivotal whether or not they have consciousness – i.e. conscious pain, other forms of consciousness, or conscious selves?
- Most people working on animal ethics would say "YES, consciousness is necessary for moral standing." We read these three authors and you can find the articles in Module 3.
- Peter Singer, "Equality for Animals" (see p. 50) – he says for animals to have interests it's necessary and sufficient for them to feel conscious pain
- Donaldson & Kymlicka – "Universal Rights for Animals" – their argument turns on the assumption that animals are "subjects of a life" or "selves," which presumably requires consciousneess.
- Lori Gruen – "Entangled Empathy" – to the extent that empathy involves feeling what another individual feels, it seems to presuppose consciousness
- Some people say NO, consciousness is not necessary for moral standing.
- Peter Carruthers – moral standing is rooted in the social contract, not consciousness (but then, he doesn't think animals have moral standing) (in Module 3)
- Marian Stamp Dawkins – "Animal Welfare without Consciousness" NEW & RECOMMENDED
- we read an article of hers in which she argues that we cannot know whether animals are conscious. However, she also thinks that ethically it doesn't matter. She thinks animal welfare matters so long as animals have preferences, which are revealed by their behavior. She doesn't talk about invertebrates, but it seems easier to show they have preferences than to show they are conscious.
- Paul Taylor – this author thinks any organism with a "good of its own" has moral standing. So animals have moral standing, including invertebrates, but plants do as well. This is too much to get into for this paper, but something to be aware of.
Do invertebrates have consciousness--i.e. conscious pain, other forms of consciousness, or conscious selves?
- Animal pain slides – Look at the slides before reading more about specific species
- Animal consciousness slides – ditto
- Pain in molluscs and crustaceans. Lynn Sneddon, "Pain in Aquatic Animals" NEW & RECOMMENDED
- Read the beginning and then scroll down to the section on molluscs (for clams, oysters, etc.) or crustaceans (for lobsters)
- Hard question: suppose there appear to be "nociceptors" in a species, but all the higher stages of pain are absent. Are they really pain receptors?
- Are insects conscious? Andrew B. Barron and Colin Klein, "What Insects Can Tell Us about the Origins of Consciousness" NEW & RECOMMENDED
- They say yes, insects are conscious. This looks pretty technical. The article is discussed non-technically in this New York Times article.
- What about cephalopods (e.g. octopus)? – look in the deWaal index and you'll find several pages about them
Is it OK to eat clams, oysters, and lobsters and to put honey in your tea? These authors go beyond the question of moral standing.
- David Foster Wallace, "Consider the Lobster" This is a classic of narrative non-fiction.
- David Cascio, "On the Consumption of Bivalves" Thorough article, recently recommended by Peter Singer on Twitter. Deals with issues about animal minds and ethics. NEW AND RECOMMENDED
- Doris Lin, "Should Vegans Eat Honey?"